Abstract: When it comes to lies, the beneficiaries of one's dishonesty play an important role in the decision-making process. Altruistic lies that are made with the intention of benefiting others are a specific type of lies and very common in real life. While it has been shown that altruistic goals influence (dis)honest behaviors, the neural substrates of this effect is still unknown. To reveal how the brain integrates altruistic goals into (dis)honest decisions, this study used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural activity of participants in a real incentivized context while they were making (dis)honest decisions. We manipulated the beneficiaries of individuals' decisions (self vs. a charity) and whether the choices of higher payoffs involved deception or not. While finding that participants lied more often to benefit charities than for themselves, we observed that the altruistic goal of benefiting a charity, compared with the self-serving goal, reduced the activity in the anterior insula (AI) when lying to achieve higher payoffs. Furthermore, the degree of altruistic goal-induced reduction of AI activity was positively correlated with the degree of altruistic goal-induced reduction of honesty concerns. These results suggest that the AI serves as a neural hub in modulating the effect of altruistic goals on deception, which shed light on the underlying neural mechanism of altruistic lies. Hum Brain Mapp 38:3675-3690, 2017.
INTRODUCTION
Both honesty and altruism are pivotal virtues across cultures. Accumulated evidence shows that lying for personal gain is psychologically costly [Lundquist et al., 2009] . Introducing honesty concerns in decision-making (i.e., the concerns of increasing one's own benefits through lying) decreases the tendency toward materially self-serving advantageous choices [Gneezy, 2005] as well as the tendency to avoid such situations [Shalvi et al., 2011] . Even in a context where lying is not punished or causes no (direct) harm to others, many individuals behave honestly and forfeit dishonest gains [Erat and Gneezy, 2012; L opez-P erez and Spiegelman, 2013; . Actions which violate moral norms evoke negative emotional experiences (e.g., guilt or aversion), even if there is no victim or any direct damage [Basile et al., 2011] . However, compared with self-serving lies, other-serving deceptive behavior are perceived to be more morally acceptable Levine and Schweitzer, 2014] . One previous study showed that a significant proportion of participants are willing to lie to benefit others even at the expense of their own payoffs [Erat and Gneezy, 2012] . A charitable donation, as a critical example of human altruistic behaviors [Milinski et al., 2002; Moll et al., 2006] , promotes lying behavior when it benefits charities [Lewis et al., 2012] . Moreover, individual differences are expected in the altruistic impact on lying behaviors as altruistic goals might help to overcome the psychological barrier of lying to different extents [Biziou-van-Pol et al., 2015] . In a study about hypothetical decisions of lying or telling the truth to harm or benefit others, harmful dishonest decisions elicited higher activation in the temporoparietal junction and the right medial frontal cortex than harmful honest decisions . However, no significant differences were found between helpful honest decisions and helpful dishonest decisions. Although altruistic lies are very common in real life and there are many behavioral studies on this topic, the underlying neural mechanisms engaged in the modulation of deception-related choices by altruistic goals remain unknown.
The influence of altruistic goals on the lying-related decision-making process might function via neural hubs which integrate multiple functions, especially negative emotion and altruistic intention. The insula is one of the key brain regions which provide an interface for these functions [Chang et al., 2013] . It represents somatic states which arise in the process of emotions and provides signals for making fast and (sometimes) advantageous economic decisions [Bechara and Damasio, 2005] . The insula selectively responds to deontological guilt (i.e., a sense of responsibility which is caused by violating inner moral rules and leads to punishment seeking and sin expiation) [Basile et al., 2011] . Particularly, the anterior part of the insula (AI) is strongly associated with the prediction and detection of different aversive stimuli [Caria et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2011; Liljeholm et al., 2014; Nitschke et al., 2006] . The neuroimaging literature consistently shows the involvement of the AI in deceptive decision making [Baumgartner et al., 2009 [Baumgartner et al., , 2013 Christ et al., 2009; Farah et al., 2014; Lisofsky et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2015; Volz et al., 2015] . Negative emotional experiences during lying might be related with stronger AI activation, which in turn might be modulated by altruistic goals. With regard to altruistic intention, empathy is usually thought as a key mechanism providing the motivation for altruistic behaviors [De Waal, 2008] . The AI is one of the brain regions that are strongly associated with and necessary for empathy [Lamm et al., 2011; Singer and Lamm, 2009; Singer et al., 2004] . Lesions in the AI resulted in deficits in both explicit and implicit empathetic pain perception [Gu et al., 2012] . A whole-brain quantitative meta-analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of empathy showed that the left AI was involved in both the affective perceptual form and the cognitive-evaluative form of empathy, while the right AI was involved in the affective perceptual form only [Fan et al., 2011] . The critical role of AI in empathy indicates its engagement in processing the feeling states of self and others which might promote prosocial helping [Bernhardt and Singer, 2012] . Previous studies found that greater empathy-related neural responses in the AI promoted prosocial behaviors [Hein et al., 2010; Masten et al., 2011] . For example, participants with greater activation in the AI were less likely to financially harm a charity [Greening et al., 2014] . Given the evidence mentioned above, the AI might play a crucial role in integrating altruistic goals in the deceptive decision-making process.
To address the question how altruistic goals affect lying behaviors as well as the neural correlates in general and how such effect was further modulated by individual difference, we adopted a modified version of the senderreceiver game [Gneezy, 2005] in combination with fMRI. In the original version of this game, a sender has the complete information of two options. Each option proposes a certain monetary split between the sender and an anonymous receiver, resulting in an advantageous consequence for either the sender (e.g., option A) or the recipient (e.g., option B). Notably, the payoff information of each option is unknown to the receiver. The sender sends a message providing the information about the advantageous option to the receiver (e.g., a truthful message: "Option B will earn you more money than option A" or a false message: "Option A will earn you more money than option B"). Solely based on the sender's message, the receiver decides to implement one of the two options. If the receiver believes the sender's message, the receiver might choose the advantageous option alleged by the sender. If the receiver does not believe the sender's message, the receiver might choose the other one. Therefore, the sender might be able to earn more by sending a false message. Through manipulating monetary payoffs in the two options, the role of monetary consequences for both the r Yin et al. r r 3676 r sender and the receiver in sender's decisions of lying was studied. However, this might cause a potential problem called "sophisticated deception" [Sutter, 2009] . In particular, if a sophisticated sender would like to profit more from the game but the sender believes that the receiver will not believe the message, the sender might send a truthful message (e.g., "Option B will earn you more money than option A") instead of a false one and expect the receiver to choose the option that is advantageous to the sender (e.g., option A). One previous study showed that the neural process underlying sophisticated deception is different from that underlying simple deception [Volz et al., 2015] , thus complicating the applicability of the original experimental design. In our study, we are mainly interested in how the presence of altruistic goals influences the senders' decisions of sending truthful or false messages. To reduce the confounding effect mentioned above, we modified the message conveyed from the sender; namely, it is only about a computer's random choice of the payoff option and does not contain any information about the advantageous option (e.g., "The computer chose option A to be implemented"). In our study, we categorized all the trials into two conditions based on whether participants could earn more by deceiving the receiver (i.e., honesty concerns condition) or not (i.e., no honesty concerns condition). More importantly, we introduced the key manipulation of making either charities or the participants themselves as the beneficiaries (i.e., the Charity condition and the Self condition) to test the specific effect of altruistic goals on deception. In the Charity condition, the sender's payoffs would be donated to a pre-selected charity, while the sender's payoffs would be earned by the participants themselves in the Self condition. Therefore, the current design allowed us to (1) observe how participants' lying behaviors change when they are faced with two different scenarios, that is, lying to benefit themselves or to benefit a charity, (2) quantify the individual difference of altruistic impact on lying, (3) investigate the underlying neural mechanisms.
Based on previous studies, we expected that the impact of altruistic goals on lying would be represented in the AI. Specifically, AI activity would be dampened when altruistic goals increase lying behaviors compared with a selfprofiting goal in the honesty concerns condition. Furthermore, the stronger the effect of honesty concerns is reduced by the altruistic goal, the higher the altruisminduced reduction in AI activity when lying in the honesty concerns condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Participants
Forty-seven healthy participants (29 females; mean 6 s.d. age 5 25.77 6 3.71 years, ranging from 19 to 35 years) were recruited for the fMRI experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported no prior history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. Participants all gave informed consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki (BMJ 1991; 302: 1194) . The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Bonn.
Task
In our experiment, a modified sender-receiver paradigm was adopted (Fig. 1 ). Participants were always assigned to the role of the sender and were informed that they would play a game with an anonymous receiver. In each trial, two payoff options (A and B) were displayed to the participants (Fig. 1a) . Each option consisted of the payoff for the sender (blue bar) and the receiver (red bar). The sender's payoff in one of the options was higher than the other one, whereas the receiver's payoffs remained the same in both options. The computer would randomly choose one of the options (indexed by a computer icon). The participants' task was to send a message to the receiver, indicating the computer-chosen option by pressing the response grips with the left/right index fingers within 4 s. The display positions of the payoff options (i.e., left or right side of the screen) were randomized within each participant. Once they made the decision, a yellow frame appeared to index the corresponding choice for 0.5 s, which was followed by a fixation cross for a jittered interval (i.e., 8-10 s minus reaction time of that trial). The message was framed as: "The computer chose option A (or B) to be implemented."
Crucially, in half of the trials, the sender's payoff would be donated to a pre-selected charity (indexed by a charity icon; i.e., the Charity condition; Fig. 1a, upper panel) . In the other half of the trials, participants could earn the payoff for themselves (indexed by a blue silhouette; i.e., the Self condition; Fig. 1a, lower panel) . Moreover, by manipulating the option chosen by the computer, we introduce the honesty concerns condition where participants had to lie to obtain higher payoffs (either for participants themselves or for a charity) and the no honesty concerns condition where there is no need to lie to obtain higher payoffs. In other words, participants were confronted with the honesty concerns condition if the computer chose the option with lower payoff for senders (Fig. 1a, left panel) . Otherwise, participants were placed in the no honesty concerns condition (Fig. 1a, right panel) .
During the experiment, participants were required to make a series of choices without knowing which trials would eventually be presented to the anonymous receiver. After the experiment, the computer would randomly select two trials with either the participant or a pre-selected charity as the beneficiary respectively, to maintain the independence of choices and avoid habituation. The messages of the two selected trials would be sent to the receiver. The receiver would first read the messages and then decide to believe or not. If the receiver believed the The experimental paradigm of the sender-receiver game. Participants in the scanner were always assigned to the role of the sender. (a) Two payoff options were displayed to the participant, one of which was chosen by a computer. The blue and red bars represented the payoff for the sender and the payoff for an anonymous receiver, respectively. The payoff for the sender would be either donated to a pre-selected charity (Charity condition; indexed by a charity icon; upper panel) or earned by the participant (Self condition; indexed by a blue silhouette; lower panel). If the computer chose the lower payoff option (i.e., option B in this example), participant had to lie to achieve a higher payoff for either themselves or a charity, which induces honesty concerns (honesty concerns condition; left panel). If the computer chose the higher payoff option (i.e., option A), participant could earn a higher payoff for either him/herself or a charity by telling the truth (no honesty concerns condition; right panel). Participant chose one of two payoff options to send a message. The message (e.g., "The computer chose option A to be implemented") together with the initial of that participant's name (e.g., L.Y.), if selected, would further be forwarded to an anonymous receiver after the scanning. (b) If the receiver believed the participant's message, the option chosen by the participant would be implemented (the option marked by the yellow frame; left panel). If the receiver did not believe, both the receiver and the sender earned e0 (right panel). (c) Possible monetary outcomes of the exemplified trials based on different decisions of both the sender and the receiver. Trials marked by yellow stars (i.e., beneficial lies) are the trials of interest. Abbreviations: Charity-benefit lie/Self-benefit lie: lying to get higher payoffs for a charity/participants themselves in the honesty concerns condition; Charity-benefit truth/Self-benefit truth: truth-telling to get higher payoffs for a charity/participants themselves in the no honesty concerns condition; RT: reaction time. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] message, the option selected by the participant would be implemented (Fig. 1b, left panel) . Participants were also told that after the receiver chose to believe the messages, the corresponding information, including the two payoff options, the truthfulness of the messages, and the final implemented options, would be presented to the receiver. If the receiver did not believe the message, both the receiver and the participant (or the charity) would earn e0 for that trial (Fig. 1b, right panel) .
In the exemplified trial in Figure 1 , the payoff allocation in option A consists of e10 for the sender and e6 for the receiver, and in option B e6 for the sender and e6 for the receiver. Therefore, option A is the option with higher payoff for the sender. Possible outcomes of the exemplified trial based on different respective decisions of the sender and the receiver are shown in Figure 1c . Independent of the senders' decisions, not believing messages would lead to minimum payoffs for both players. If the receiver believed the messages, payoffs would vary depending on the senders' decisions. In the honesty concerns condition, the computer chose the low payoff option (i.e., option B), implying that participants could get e10 by choosing option A (i.e., sending a false message). Participants would instead get e6 if they chose option B and sent a truthful message. In the no honesty concerns condition, the computer chose the high payoff option (i.e., option A) and participants could get e10 by sending a truthful message. Receiver's payoffs remain the same (i.e., e6), regardless of participants' choices. The trials of interest are the ones where participants made decisions that lead to high payoffs, which are dishonest decisions in the honesty concerns condition and honest decisions in the no honesty concerns condition (trials marked by yellow stars).
Design and Stimuli
The current event-related fMRI study adopted a two-bytwo within-subject factorial design. The two factors were beneficiary (i.e., the conditions with participants themselves and charity as the beneficiaries; abbrev.: Self and Charity) and honesty concerns (i.e., with and without honesty concerns to get higher payoff conditions). The onerun scanning task consisted of 192 trials in total (48 trials per condition). Sender's payoffs differed in two payoff options (Table I ). The low payoffs for the sender were drawn from three monetary amounts (e2, e6, or e10). The high payoff for the sender was built based on the low payoff with one of the following increments: e1, e4, e6, e8, and e15 (i.e., absolute difference; abbrev.: AD). Within each condition, each combination with ADs of e4, e6, and e8 repeated four times and the remaining repeated twice. To eliminate the impact of social preference (i.e., concerns about the receiver's monetary payoffs) on the decisionmaking process, the receiver's payoffs were always identical regardless of the sender's choices. In half of the trials, the payoffs for the receiver in both options were equal to the low payoffs for the sender. In the other half, the receiver's payoffs were equal to high payoffs for the sender.
Based on participants' decisions, trials were categorized into the following eight conditions: lying to get higher payoff for a charity or participants themselves in the honesty concerns condition (Charity-benefit/Self-benefit lie; Fig. 1a green/red panel); truth-telling to get higher payoffs for a charity or participants themselves in the no honesty concerns condition (Charity-benefit/Self-benefit truth; Fig. 1a upper/lower yellow panel); truth-telling to get lower payoffs for a charity/participants themselves in the honesty concerns condition (Charityharm/Self-harm truth); lying to get lower payoffs for a charity/ participants themselves in the no honesty concerns condition (Charity-harm/Self-harm lie).
All stimuli were presented using Presentation v14 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA) on a 32 00 liquid crystal display (NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway) outside the scanner with a resolution of 800 3 600 pixels, using a mirror system attached to the head coil.
Procedure
Before the fMRI experiment, all participants read a brief introduction to six charitable organizations (for similar procedure, see [Kuss et al., 2013] ) and selected one organization to be the beneficiary of the fMRI experiment. Before the scanning, they read the instructions, completed a questionnaire to ensure that they fully understood the task, and signed a consent form which authorized the experimenters to donate the money from the charity condition to the pre-selected charitable organizations. Participants were also informed that the receiver would not know the identity of the senders and only the initials would be shown to
TABLE I. Payoff structure (in euro)
AD: absolute difference between the high payoff and the low payoff for the sender; High: the high payoff for the sender; Low: the low payoff for the sender. The combinations marked by * repeated four times in each condition; others repeated twice in each condition.
the receiver, and that they would not meet the receiver during or after the experiment. Next, participants completed a practice session in the scanner to familiarize themselves with the paradigm. The whole scanning lasted around 40 minutes. After that, two trials were randomly selected, namely one trial with participants as the beneficiary and the other with the pre-selected charity as the beneficiary. Unknown to the participants, the receiver in the experiment was a confederate and believed all messages sent by participants. Finally, participants were informed of the total payoff (i.e., e10 participation fee plus the payoff of the selected trial from the game) and paid accordingly. According to participants' choices, the amount of money in the selected charity trials was donated to the corresponding charitable organizations.
Data Acquisition
Participants' responses in the scanner were collected via an MRI-compatible response device (NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway). All images were acquired on a Siemens Trio 3.0-Tesla scanner with a standard 32-channel head coil. Structural scans included T1-weighted images (TR 5 1,660 ms; TE 5 2.75 ms; flip angle 5 98; slice thickness 5 0.8 mm). The functional scans were acquired using T2*-weighted echo planar images (EPI) pulse sequence using a BOLD contrast (TR 5 2,500 ms; TE 5 30 ms; flip angle 5 908; 37 slices with 3 mm slice thickness; 96 3 96 acquisition matrix; field of view 5192 3 192 mm 2 ; voxel size 5 2 3 2 3 3 mm 3 ). Slices were axially oriented along the AC-PC plane and acquired in ascending order.
Data Analyses
Data from five participants were excluded due to following reasons: two for excessive head movements (i.e., > 3mm or 38 of rotation), two for technical failure during scanning and one due to failure to understand the game correctly. All following analyses were based on the data of remaining 42 participants (26 females; mean 6 s.d. age 5 25.45 6 3.43 years ranged from 19 to 33 years).
Behavioral Data Analyses
Statistical analyses of the proportion of choices and reaction time were conducted with SPSS 22.0 (IBM Corporation, Armonk, NY). Two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and Spearman correlation were performed as indicated. All reported P values were two-tailed and P < 0.05 was considered statistically significant.
Measure of the effect of honesty concerns
The effect of honesty concerns is operationalized by the ratios of payoff loss (abbrev.: PL) caused by honesty concerns in the current study. The introduction of honesty concerns in the honesty concerns condition influences individuals' decisions of choosing high payoff options to different extents. An individual who was sensitive to the introduction of honesty concerns would choose high payoff options less in the honesty concerns condition than in the no honesty concerns condition, whereas an individual who was not influenced by the honesty concerns would behave identically in both conditions. To measure the effect of honesty concerns in each individual, we first calculated the total payoff increase in all the trials where individuals chose higher payoff options instead of lower payoff options in the no honesty concerns condition versus that in the honesty concerns condition, and then calculated the ratios of the PL in the honesty concerns condition [see Eqs. (1) and (2) for PL calculation in the Charity condition and the Self condition respectively].
(1)
In Eq. (1), N AD i Charity2benefit2truth (N AD i Charity2benefit2lie ) denotes the numbers of choosing higher payoff options in trials with certain absolute difference AD i (i.e., 1, 4, 6, 8, or 15) in the no honesty concerns condition (in the honesty concerns condition) with a charity as the beneficiary. P 5 i51 N AD i Charity2benefit2truth Á AD i and P 5 i51 N AD i Charity2benefit2lie Á AD i denote the total amount of payoff increase when participants chose higher payoff options. The rules hold true for the Eq. (2) except that the beneficiaries were participants themselves. PL Charity and PL Self denote the ratios of PL caused by the introduction of honesty concerns in the charity and the self-profit conditions, respectively. A higher value of PL indicates a larger ratio of payoff loss due to the introduction of honesty concerns.
Then, the altruistic impact on the ratios of PL was computed as the difference between PL Self and PL Charity :
PL Self-Charity in Eq. (3) denotes the impact of altruistic goals on the ratios of PL caused by the introduction of honesty concerns. If PL Self-Charity > 0, the charity-profit goal reduces the ratios of PL. If PL Self-Charity < 0, the charity-profit goal increases the ratios of PL. If PL Self-Charity 5 0, the ratios of PL are indifferent between the Charity and the Self conditions. The higher the difference of PL between the Self condition and the Charity condition, the stronger the impact of altruistic goals on the effect of honesty concerns (i.e., to what extent the charity-profit goal decreases the effect of honesty concerns). For example, a participant chose to get higher payoffs by telling the truth in the Self condition regardless of different ADs, and chose to get higher payoffs by lying in none out of six Self trials with the AD of e1, six out of 12 Self trials with the ADs of e4, e6, and e8, and all six Self trials with the AD of e15. If the participant chose the higher payoffs to profit charity in both the honesty concerns and no honesty concerns conditions regardless of different ADs, the Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) would be:
PL Self2Charity 5PL Self 2PL Charity 50:372050:37:
In this example, participant's ratio of PL was lower in the Charity condition than the Self condition. In other words, the charity-profit goal decreases the effect of honesty concerns in this participant.
fMRI Data Analyses
SPM8 was adopted for fMRI data analysis (Welcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK; http:// www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). For each participant, EPI images were first realigned and corrected for slice timing. Data sets that exhibited movement of >3 mm or 38 of rotation were not included. The anatomical image was coregistered to the mean EPI image, and segmented, generating parameters for normalization to MNI space. EPI data were then projected onto MNI space with a 2 3 2 3 2 mm 3 resolution and smoothed using an 8-mm FWHM (full width at half maximum) isotropic Gaussian kernel. High-pass temporal filtering with a cut-off of 128 s was performed to remove low-frequency drifts.
The statistical analyses of the fMRI data were based on three general linear models (i.e., GLMs 1-3). The canonical hemodynamic response function was used to model the fMRI signal. Based on participants' decisions and the events of our interest, trials were categorized into the following six conditions: Charity-benefit lie, Self-benefit lie, Charity-benefit truth, Self-benefit truth, Charity-harm truth, and Charity-harm truth. The last two conditions were only used in GLM 3 for addressing a different research question (see GLM 3 for details). Given very limited lying trials in the no honesty concerns condition (mean numbers of trials in the conditions of Charity-harm lie and Self-harm lie: 3.24 and 4.98), these two conditions were not used in the fMRI analysis.
GLM 1
GLM 1 was set up to investigate neural correlates of altruistic impact on lying, as well as neural correlates which reflect individual differences in the altruistic impact on the effect of honesty concerns. Four regressors of interest were included, which contained the onsets of: (1) Charity-benefit lie; (2) Self-benefit lie; (3) Charity-benefit truth; (4) Self-benefit truth. Besides, four regressors of interest were parametrically modulated by the AD to remove the confounding effects which might be driven by (1) the payoff differences between the high payoff and the low payoff for the sender and (2) disadvantageous and advantageous inequality situations [Hsu et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2014] . Onsets of other events (i.e., trials with no response and trials with decisions which lead to lower payoff outcomes for senders) were regarded as no interest and combined into one regressor (i.e., other regressor). We built contrast images for regressors of interest in each participant.
In the group analysis, four contrasts (i.e., Charity-benefit lie, Self-benefit lie, Charity-benefit truth, and Self-benefit truth) for each participant were entered into a flexible factorial model with two within-group factors (beneficiary [Self vs. Charity] and decision [beneficial lies vs. beneficial truth]). To further investigate the neural representation of the altruistic impact on lying, we first ran paired t-tests on the contrast of Self-benefit lie versus Charity-benefit lie at the group level. To examine whether the altruistic goals have any effect on truth-telling in the no honesty concerns condition, we also ran paired t-tests on the contrast of Self-benefit truth versus Charity-benefit truth. Second, to investigate the neural representations of individual differences in the altruistic impact on the effect of honesty concerns, the estimated altruistic impact on the ratio of PL for each participant (i.e., PL Self-Charity ) was entered into a group-level regression analysis examining the neural response of altruistic impact on lying (Self-benefit lie vs. Charity-benefit lie). Besides, we also performed paired t-tests on the contrasts of Self-benefit lie versus Self-benefit truth and Charity-benefit lie versus Charitybenefit truth. In GLM 1, data from five participants were removed from the analysis due to insufficient trials (<5) [Hu et al., 2016] for at least one of regressors of interest (Charity-benefit lie and Self-benefit lie). Therefore, data from 37 participants (25 females) were included.
GLM 2
To further control the payoff differences between the honesty concerns condition and the no honesty concerns conditions, GLM 2 was applied. Similar to GLM 1, we defined four regressors of interest. More importantly, we ensured that lying and truth-telling trials were with identical payoff structure and the same final payoffs within the Self and the Charity conditions. The onsets of the other events (i.e., trials with no response, trials with unbalanced payoff structures, and trials with decisions which lead to lower payoff outcomes for senders) were regarded as variables of no interest and combined into one other regressor. Those four regressors of interest were parametrically modulated by the AD.
To check if we could replicate the findings of GLM 1, we ran the same group-level paired t-tests on the contrasts of r Altruistic Goals Modulate Processing of Deception r r 3681 r Self-benefit lie versus Charity-benefit lie and Self-benefit truth versus Charity-benefit truth in GLM 2. To further investigate if there is a significant correlation between behavioral and neural altruistic impact on lying after we controlled the payoff differences, we performed a group-level regression analysis on the neural response of altruistic impact on lying (i.e., [Self-benefit lie -Self-benefit truth] vs. [Charity-benefit lieCharity-benefit truth]) with individual PL Self-Charity as the predictor. In GLM 2, additional data from one participant was removed due to insufficient trials (<5) after balancing payoff differences between Charity-benefit lie and Self-benefit lie as well as payoff differences between Charity-benefit truth and Self-benefit truth. Therefore, data from 36 participants (25 females) were included.
GLM 3
In both GLM 1 and GLM 2, the altruistic impact on truth-telling in the no honesty concerns condition was investigated. However, the altruistic impact on truthtelling in the honesty concerns condition might be different because it might involve the process of refraining from dishonest gains. To explore our data and investigate the neural correlates of the altruistic impact on the truthtelling in the honesty concerns condition, we applied GLM 3. To do this, we defined four regressors of interest, namely the onsets of: (1) Charity-benefit lie; (2) Charity-harm truth; (3) Self-benefit lie; (4) Self-harm truth. The onsets of the other events (i.e., trials with no response and trials without honesty concerns) were regarded as variables of no interest and combined into one other regressor. Those four regressors of interest were parametrically modulated by the AD. We built contrast images for regressors of interest in each participant and ran paired t-tests on the contrasts of Self-benefit lie versus Charity-benefit lie and Self-harm truth versus Charity-harm truth at the group level. Specifically, the contrast of Self-harm truth versus Charity-harm truth corresponds to the altruistic impact on the truth-telling. In GLM 3, data from 23 participants (14 females) were included as they had sufficient trials (!5) in each condition of interest (especially the Charity-harm truth and the Self-harm truth conditions).
We reported regions as significant if they passed the whole-brain cluster family-wise error (FWE) correction at P < 0.05, with an uncorrected voxel-level cluster-defining threshold of P < 0.001 [Eklund et al., 2016] , if there is no additional statement. Given our hypothesis, a region of interest (ROI) approach was adopted for the analyses with the focus on the bilateral AI. In particular, the left and the right AI were defined by applying the restriction of y > 0 (MNI coordinate) to the left and right insula anatomical masks, which were independently defined via Wake Forest University Pickatlas toolbox [Maldjian et al., 2003] . Results were considered significant if they survived the threshold of FWE-corrected cluster-or voxel-level P < 0.05 with small volume correction (SVC) using the pre-defined AI mask as the search volume.
To further investigate whether activity in the ROI (i.e., AI) was modulated by disadvantageous and advantageous inequality situations, an additional GLM was performed (see Supplementary material for details).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
To check whether altruistic goals influence the probability of choosing higher payoff options in the honesty concerns condition and in the no honesty concerns condition, we performed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on all participants (N 5 42; Fig. 2a ). As expected, participants lied more to get higher payoffs for a charity (Charity-benefit lie; mean 6 s.d.: 61.94 6 32.27%) than for themselves (Self-benefit lie; 55.08 6 31.42%; Z5 22.27, P 5 0.02). The difference between the percentages of choosing higher payoffs by truth-telling between two conditions showed a trend toward significance (Charity-benefit truth vs. Self-benefit truth: 93.03 6 15.84% vs. 89.38 6 18.16%; Z 5 21.77, P 5 0.08). The results hold true in the sample of 37 participants whose data were used in fMRI GLM 1 analysis (Charity-benefit lie vs. Self-benefit lie: 69.06 6 27.10% vs. 61.56 6 27.28%; Z 5 22.25, P 5 0.02; Charity-benefit truth vs. Self-benefit truth: 92.14 6 16.70% vs. 88.00 6 18.95%; Z 5 21.75, P 5 0.06). In Figure 2b , participants' lying probabilities in the honesty concerns conditions with a charity and participants themselves as beneficiaries with five different ADs are shown (see the supplementary result for details).
With respect to reaction time, we found a trend-tosignificant difference between the Charity-benefit lie (mean 6 s.d.: 1,577 6 531 ms) and Self-benefit lie conditions (1,538 6 531 ms; Z 5 21.70, P 5 0.09, N 5 37). Participants were significantly faster in making honest decisions in the no honesty concerns condition with participants themselves as beneficiaries than in the no honesty concerns condition with a charity as beneficiaries (Self-benefit truth vs. Charity-benefit truth: 1,312 6 419 ms vs. 1,367 6 414 ms; Z 5 22.75, P 5 0.006, N 5 37).
For each participant, estimated PL ratios in the Self and Charity conditions were shown in Figure 3a (a) Estimated payoff loss (PL) ratios in the Charity condition and the Self condition. Gray dash line captures the indifferent PL ratios caused by honesty concerns between the Charity and the Self conditions. Green circles: participants whose PL ratio is higher in the Self condition than in the Charity condition. Red triangles: participants whose PL ratio is lower in the Self condition than in the Charity condition. Gray squares: participants whose PL ratios are indifferent between the Self and the Charity conditions.
(b) Distribution of PL Self-Charity across participants. (c) The correlation between the altruistic impact on PL ratios and the altruistic impact on the probability of lying in the honesty concerns condition. Scatter plot of lying percentage differences in the honesty concerns condition between the Self and the Charity conditions (N 5 42) versus PL Self-Charity . The solid line is the regression line with a 95% confidence interval (CI; gray dash line). [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] r Altruistic Goals Modulate Processing of Deception r r 3683 r distribution of the altruistic impact on PL ratios across participants is shown in Figure 3b . A Spearman correlation test was conducted to further investigate whether the parameters of PL Self-Charity correlate with the lying probability differences in the honesty concerns conditions between the Self and Charity conditions. The differences between the lying probability in the honesty concerns conditions between the Self and Charity conditions negatively correlated with the impact of altruistic goals on PL ratios (PL Self-Charity ; r 5 20.73, P < 0.001, N 5 42; Fig. 3c ). Participants whose PL ratios were reduced by the altruistic goals to a greater extent lied more to get higher payoffs for a charity in the honesty concerns condition (i.e., Charity-benefit lie) than for themselves (i.e., Self-benefit lie).
Neuroimaging Results
In GLM 1, the results of the flexible factorial model with two within-group factors [beneficiary (Self vs. Charity) and decision (beneficial lies vs beneficial truth)] were reported in the supplementary material (Supporting Information Table  S1 ). Importantly, the right AI was activated in the main effects of Self versus Charity and beneficial lie versus beneficial truth. As expected, the contrast corresponding to altruistic impact on lying (i.e., Self-benefit lie vs. Charity-benefit lie) showed significant activation in the right AI ( Fig. 4 ; Table  II ). The left AI was also activated in this contrast under a more lenient threshold (P < 0.001 uncorrected and k 5 88; peak MNI coordinate: 228/20/-8). No significant results were found in the AI in either the opposite contrast or in the contrast of Self-benefit truth versus Charity-benefit truth, even with a lenient threshold (i.e., the uncorrected voxel-level threshold of P < 0.005). The regression analysis showed significant positive correlations between the altruistic impact on left and right AI activity (peak MNI coordinates: 228/12/ -12 and 32/24/6; Self-benefit lie vs. Charity-benefit lie) and PL Self-Charity (left AI: t (35) 5 3.58, right AI: t (35) 5 3.53, P FWE-SVC < 0.05). The remaining results in GLM 1 were shown in Supporting Information Table S2 . Charity-benefit lie > Self-benefit lie None Charity-benefit lie < Self-benefit lie Anterior insula R 247 4.66 36 24 24 Charity-benefit truth > Self-benefit truth None Charity-benefit truth < Self-benefit truth None
Voxel-level threshold P < 0.001 uncorrected, cluster-level P < 0.05 whole-brain FWE correction. Charity-benefit lie: lying to get higher payoffs for a charity in the honesty concerns condition. Self-benefit lie: lying to get higher payoffs for participants themselves in the honesty concerns condition. Charity-benefit truth: truth-telling to get higher payoffs for a charity in the no honesty concerns condition. Self-benefit truth: truth-telling to get higher payoffs for participants themselves in the no honesty concerns condition.
After controlling for the payoff differences in GLM 2, altruistic impact on lying was related to right AI activity in the contrast of Self-benefit lie versus Charity-benefit lie under a lenient threshold (P < 0.001 uncorrected and k 5 133; peak MNI coordinate: 36/24/-4). No significant activation in the AI was found in the opposite contrast. We did not observe the significant altruistic impact on truth-telling in the no honesty concerns condition (i.e., Self-benefit truth vs. Charity-benefit truth). A significant positive correlation (P FWE-SVC < 0.05) was found between PL Self-Charity and the altruistic impact on lying-specific activity (i.e., [Self-benefit lie -Self-benefit truth]v.s [Charitybenefit lie -Charity-benefit truth]) in the left and right AI (left AI: t (34) 5 3.85, right AI: t (34) 5 3.92, peak MNI coordinates: 236/18/2 and 34/20/4; Fig. 5 ). Additional analysis on the influence of inequality on differential AI activation between the Self condition and the Charity condition did not show a difference in inequality-related AI activation (see Supporting Information Table S3 for details).
In GLM 3, significant activation in the right AI was found in the contrast of Self-benefit lie versus Charity-benefit lie ( Fig. 6a; Table III ), which was similar to previous findings. Truth-telling to refrain from dishonest gains for a charity elicited higher activity in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) than for participants (Charity-harm truth vs. Self-harm truth; Fig. 6b ). No significant results were found in the opposite contrasts.
DISCUSSION
The current study investigated how altruistic goals modulate the neural processing of deception by adopting a modified sender-receiver paradigm. Behaviorally, we found that Neural representations of the altruistic impact on the effect of honesty concerns (GLM 2; N 5 36). (a) The altruistic impact on lying associated AI activity (i.e., (Self-benefit lie -Self-benefit truth) versus (Charity-benefit lie -Charity-benefit truth)) positively correlated with PL Self-Charity . All effects were significant after SVC (P FWE-corrected < 0.05). For illustration purpose, results are displayed at an uncorrected significance threshold (P < 0.005, k > 100). Plot of the positive correlation between the altruistic impact on honesty concerns and parameter estimates in the local peak voxels of the left (b) and the right anterior insula (c) for the contrast of (Self-benefit lie -Self-benefit truth) versus (Charity-benefit lie -Charity-benefit truth). Green circles: participants whose payoff loss (PL) ratio is higher in the Self condition than in the Charity condition. Red triangles: participants whose PL ratio is lower in the Self condition than in the Charity condition. Gray squares: participants whose PL ratios caused by honesty concerns are indifferent between the Self and the Charity conditions. Abbreviations: Self-benefit lie/Charity-benefit lie: lying to get higher payoffs for participants themselves/a charity in the honesty concerns condition; Self-benefit truth/Charitybenefit truth: truth-telling to get higher payoffs for participants themselves/a charity in the no honesty concerns condition; AI: anterior insula. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary. com] r Altruistic Goals Modulate Processing of Deception r r 3685 r participants showed a tendency of favoring lying behaviors that benefit a charity. Compared with selfish lies, lies with altruistic intention are often considered more socially and morally acceptable . Altruistic goals of deception can exert positive influences such as increasing trust in liars who tell prosocial lies [Levine and Schweitzer, 2015] and reducing negative feelings toward lying. Former studies showed that if the outcomes were beneficial to the recipients, the recipients' valence differences between lies and truth were reduced and the reluctance to lie decreased when the outcomes were beneficial for charities [Lewis et al., 2012] .
At the neural level, the AI is associated with the impact of altruistic goals on lying but not truth-telling in both the honesty concerns condition and the no honesty concerns condition. Recent findings of a resting-state EEG study showed that people with a higher neural baseline activation in the AI showed a lower propensity to deceive [Baumgartner et al., 2013] . The finding suggests a potential link between the AI and individual differences in the reluctance to lie, which was also addressed in the current study. We found that participants whose honesty concerns were more strongly decreased by altruistic goals (i.e., with larger PL Self-Charity ) showed a higher altruistic goal- Results of Self-benefit lie versus Charity-benefit lie and Charity-harm truth versus Self-harm truth (GLM 3; N 5 23) . (a) The contrast of Self-benefit lie versus Charity-benefit lie activated the right AI. Parameter estimates were extracted from the whole activated cluster in the right AI (error bars: s.e.m.). (b) The contrast of Charity-harm truth versus Self-harm truth activated the VMPFC. Parameter estimates were extracted from the whole activated cluster in the VMPFC (error bars: s.e.m.). Abbreviations: Selfbenefit lie/Charity-benefit lie: lying to get higher payoffs for participants themselves/a charity in the honesty concerns condition; Charity-harm truth/Self-harm truth: truth-telling to get lower payoffs for a charity/participants themselves in the honesty concerns condition; AI: anterior insula; VMPFC: ventral medial prefrontal cortex. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] r Yin et al. r r 3686 r induced reduction of AI activity. Our results resonate with previous findings and further support the hypotheses that the AI is highly involved in coding the impact of altruistic goals on deceptive decision-making.
The insula is one of the brain regions which is critical in reflecting negative emotional states [Calder et al., 2000] or aversive emotional experiences in social interactions [Rilling and Sanfey, 2011 ] associated with unfairness [Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008] , the threat of punishment [Spitzer et al., 2007] , and being deceived . According to the somatic-marker hypothesis, in the decision making process, the registration of body states within the insula gives rise to conscious desire or aversion to specific behavioral options and further guides behaviors based on the anticipation of emotional consequences, especially negative ones [Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Naqvi et al., 2006] . In a previous study investigating the neural response to aversive drinks intentionally delivered by others, participants felt more angry toward intentional aversive conditions. Accordingly, the AI was activated by the interaction between perceived intentionality and aversive outcome anticipation [Liljeholm et al., 2014] .
The AI also plays an important role in empathy [Jackson et al., 2005; Lamm et al., 2011; Singer et al., 2004] , a precursor of altruistic behavior [Singer and Lamm, 2009] . A study on social exclusion showed that participants with stronger neural activity to other's social pain in the right AI behaved more prosocial toward victims [Masten et al., 2011] . The impact of the AI is also found in the studies about charitable donations. In a previous fMRI study on charitable donations, decisions to oppose a donation to charities were associated with activity in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and the AI [Moll et al., 2006] . In another study about charitable decision making, increased connectivity between VMPFC and bilateral AI was found in the free and forced donation which suggests the potential role of the AI in coding social values of donation [Hare et al., 2010] . We speculate that the reduced AI activity while telling altruistic lies might be caused by modulation of altruistic goals on the processing of lying, especially negative affective states. The AI might be the key substrate in the modulation of altruistic impact on making aversive decisions (i.e., choosing to lie or not).
There are alternative interpretations about the function of the AI in our findings. A large amount of research has consistently shown the involvement of the AI in deception [Baumgartner et al., 2009 [Baumgartner et al., , 2013 Christ et al., 2009; Farah et al., 2014; Lisofsky et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2015 Sun et al., , 2016 Volz et al., 2015] . In a meta-analysis about instructed lying and truth-telling, the insula, bilateral inferior gyrus, and anterior cingulate cortex overlapped with more than the activation likelihood estimate maps of executive control [Christ et al., 2009] . Compared with simple deception, sophisticated deception elicited higher activation in the left insula [Volz et al., 2015] . Therefore, the insula was speculated to be associated with multiple aspects of executive control while people were lying. If the AI contributes to executive control which was modulated by altruistic goals in our study, longer reaction time should be expected in lying for oneself compared with lying for a charity. Contrary to this expectation, we found a trend-to-significant longer reaction time in the lying for a charity condition. Besides, we do not observe an involvement of the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in our study. Substantial amount of evidence shows that the DLPFC is another key region which serves a critical function in tasks that require high level of cognitive control [Aron et al., 2004; Sanfey et al., 2003; Spitzer et al., 2007] , especially deceptive decision making [Abe et al., 2007 [Abe et al., , 2006 Karton and Bachmann, 2011; Karton et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2002 Lee et al., , 2005 Luan Phan et al., 2005; Nunez et al., 2005] . For instance, Zhu et al. [2014] found that DLPFC lesion patients showed reduced honesty concerns in the sender-receiver game. Compared with the original sender-receiver game in Gneezy [2005] Voxel-level threshold P < 0.001 uncorrected, cluster-level P < 0.05 whole-brain FWE correction. Charity-benefit lie: lying to get higher payoffs for a charity in the honesty concerns condition. Self-benefit lie: lying to get higher payoffs for participants themselves in the honesty concerns condition. Charity-harm truth: truth-telling to get lower payoffs for a charity in the honesty concerns condition. Self-harm truth: truth-telling to get lower payoffs for participants themselves in the honesty concerns condition.
r Altruistic Goals Modulate Processing of Deception r r 3687 r and the deception game in Zhu et al. [2014] , we controlled confounding truth-telling behaviors (i.e., sophisticated deception) and the concerns about receivers' payoffs. Hence, our findings suggest that the altruistic goals might influence honesty concerns through the affective states via the AI rather than through cognitive control via the DLPFC. Another possible explanation of the AI activation is that the AI might reflect participants' preference for fairness or aversion to inequality [Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Hsu et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2014] caused by different payoffs between the sender and the receiver. In the study by Yu et al. [2014] the insula together with putamen and orbitofrontal cortex responded stronger to both disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. The putamen was shown to be associated with individual differences in advantageous inequality aversion, and those participants who had higher advantageous inequality aversion had less functional connectivity between the putamen and the AI. However, in our view this explanation might not fit our findings due to the following reasons: first, the differences between payoffs for senders and that for receivers, which reflects the degree of inequality, have been controlled in all GLMs as the parametric modulators so that potential effect of different degrees of inequality is supposed to be ruled out. Second, no significant difference of AI activity was found between the Charity condition and the Self condition while participants were presented with advantageous and disadvantageous inequality situations.
Beyond our main findings on AI, the explorative analyses showed that the VMPFC was activated by participants' honest behaviors which reduced payoffs for the charity (vs. for the participants themselves). One previous study found that participants were more likely to donate to a charity with higher subjective value and the VMPFC might be involved in computing the value of charitable donations [Hare et al., 2010] . The activation in the VMPFC was also found in the comparison of costly decisions (either costly donations or costly opposition to donations) versus receiving pure monetary rewards [Moll et al., 2006] . In our experiment, participants selected a preferable charitable organization to be the beneficiary of their decisions, which makes it infeasible to associate the VMPFC activity with values computation for different charitable organizations. Alternatively, it is possible that the VMPFC might be involved in the decision-making process of sacrificing social rewards (i.e., benefiting a charity more) to avoid the psychological costs of lying.
Several aspects might be worth investigating in the future. First, the detection and punishment of deception are important aspects in shaping lying and truth-telling behaviors in real life. Prefrontal regions are expected to be more involved during the decision-making process if the detection as well as punishment of lying behaviors are integrated into the paradigm. Second, our study shows the importance of the AI in integrating altruistic goals into the decision-making process to lie. Future studies may reveal whether the modulating effect of altruistic goals in lying via the AI extends to other situations, especially moral violations. What is more, repeated lying might reduce the associated emotional responses or affective assessments, and hence might further influence neural responses in regions like the amygdala and the AI [Garrett et al., 2016] . Future studies should also investigate how altruistic goals impact the habituation or the adaptation to lying. Finally, previous studies found that pathological liars showed an increase in prefrontal white matter [Yang et al., 2005 [Yang et al., , 2007 . Besides, task-independent baseline activation in the AI predicts individuals' propensity for deceptive behavior [Baumgartner et al., 2013] . In our studies, we found that the neural activity of the VMPFC and the AI was involved in the modulation of altruistic goals on the process of lying and truth-telling. In future studies, it would be important to investigate the association between anatomical features (structural) and the effect (functional) of altruistic goals on honesty concerns, especially in the prefrontal regions and the AI.
The present study bears the following limitation. To make the estimation of the event-related hemodynamic responses reliable, we excluded the participants with less than five trials in any of the conditions. Insufficient trials might lead to highly variable parameter estimates within each participant [Poldrack et al., 2011] . However, the exclusion of the participants might lead to a bias in the results, as these participants might differ from the other participants. Nevertheless, given that the FWE correction was used in GLM 1, the effect that altruistic goals decreased the activity in the AI is thought to be robust.
Taken together, the current study, to our knowledge, provides the first empirical evidence revealing the neural mechanism underlying the modulation of lying behavior by altruistic goals. Our findings extend the role of the AI in deception, and further improve our understanding toward white lie, a common but unique type of human social behaviors.
